Article by Samuel Howard

Activists of all stripes have come to Boston’s “revolutionary corridor” to make their voices heard on subjects that are important to their lives and livelihoods, even in a notable instance in 1919 when a force of generally model Boston police officers came to the corridor to strike themselves. This action occurred in the context of political conflict between Boston’s Irish and Yankees, rising costs of living and an underfunded and underpaid police force. Frustrated by fruitless attempts to resolve the problems with the administration, Boston’s police officers turned to activism. The social and ethnic tensions that troubled the city were mirrored by the eruption of riot among the gathered crowds. Ultimately, politicians’ failure to set aside their differences in policy and ethnicity had long and far reaching consequences not only for Boston, but for labor movements involving other public workers across the country.

On September 9, 1919 the police force of Boston voted 1,134 to 2 to go out on strike, an unprecedented decision made by public employees. They made this decision for reasons similar to those of other workers who had struck in the past: long hours, terrible working conditions, and insufficient pay. In 1919 Boston’s police officers had to work from 73 to 98 hours a week, depending on their assignment, in decaying, vermin infested police stations. A workday for officers could be as long as 17 hours. Furthermore, they were required to get permission from their captain before leaving the city on their days off duty. Officers were also often called back onto duty on what little time off they had. In 1919, Boston police officers worked for wages far lower than skilled workers in other trades; they earned only $1200 to $1400 a year. Furthermore, officers were required to buy their own uniforms; at $200 apiece, this was a sixth or seventh of their yearly salary. With the rising costs of living that came about as a result of World War I, such a salary was barely enough for subsistence. John McInnes, the officer who was elected as the first Boston Police Union just before the strike, stated of officers’ work conditions: [1]Joseph E. Slater, “The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” In Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the Law, and the State, 1900-1962 (Cornell University Press, 2004.), 13-38.

“’Such men are deprived of enjoying the comforts of their home and family,’ Boston Police Union president John Mclnnes insisted. Station houses were so unsanitary that the men frequently found vermin on their clothes when they went home. ‘If the board of health made an investigation as they do in the case of private houses and stores … there would be court prosecutions,’ Mclnnes lamented.” [2]Slater, “The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” 3-38.


The Political Context

The political system that was supposed to support the police as a public service instead effectively abandoned it–a casualty of the partisan and ethnic politics that defined much of Boston’s City Hall and the Massachusetts State House. After decades of building political power, the largely Democratic Irish Americans began to control City Hall in the 1880s. Opposite this Irish ascendancy in Boston, old Yankee Republicans dominated most districts outside of Boston and other mill cities, enabling them to still hold most of the power in the Massachusetts State House. In 1885, the first Irish Democrat, Hugh O’Brien became Mayor of Boston. Alarmed by this newfound prominence of Irish Democrats in Boston politics, the Republican legislature wrote and passed a new Boston city charter that curtailed the powers of the mayor in many areas. In particular, the legislature stripped the power over the Boston Police Department away from the mayor. Instead, the legislature placed the power to appoint the police commissioner in the hands of the governor, often a Republican. [3] Jack Tager, Boston Riots: Three Centuries of Social Violence (Northeastern University Press. 2001), 143–170.

Unable to control or otherwise make use of the police for political reasons, Democratic mayors saw little reason to fund a Republican controlled police force. The police reported to a commissioner chosen by the governor, and the mayor’s office could only direct the police in a time of emergency. As a direct result, the police were underpaid and stations were constantly in disrepair. The net effect of this situation after 25 years only exacerbated when World War I came to an end. The economic growth and the related increase in the cost of living that cities like Boston experienced led to unskilled factory laborers making more money than a Boston cop working a beat for longer hours. Initially, officers appeared hopeful that their grievances would be addressed. However, when the longtime commissioner, Stephen O’Meara, died suddenly in 1918, the police department lost an advocate. O’Meara’s replacement, Edwin Upton Curtis, proved a disastrous choice for the police. Curtis, descended from old New England families, came from the minority faction of Yankee Boston Republicans. He served a single one-year term as Boston’s mayor in 1895, but otherwise was a complete outsider to the Irish-dominated Boston Police Department. In the course of just nine months, any trust between the police and their new commissioner evaporated. Even though Curtis secured a pay raise in the initial months of his tenure, it was too little and too late. [4] Francis Russell, A City in Terror: 1919, the Boston Police Force Strike (Viking Press, 1975), 73 – 96, 97 – 130; Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

Ultimately, a majority of officers on August 19th, 1919 chose to form a union, with the goal of affiliating with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Curtis vehemently opposed such plans and issued a rule that threatened to suspend or dismiss any officer who joined an outside union.    [5] Russell, A City in Terror: 1919, the Boston Police Force Strike, 73 – 96.

Immediate attempts to find compromise and avoid a strike failed. Boston Mayor Andrew Peters appointed a thirty-four-member committee, led by Boston Republican James Jackson Storrow. The committee spanned the social and ethnic divisions of Boston: Yankees, the Irish, Jews, Italians, labor leaders, bankers, lawyers, and even representatives from the military met in August and September of 1919 to explore the situation. The committee reviewed the complaints and conditions of the officers and reported back to Curtis on September 6th, 1919; the committee determined that the hours, wages, and working conditions urgently needed to be addressed. However, they emphasized their disapproval of police union affiliation with the AFL, as well as a potential police strike. Having seen that there was no budging Curtis on the issues they brought to him, not even with support from the AFL and individuals from the city government, the police officers of Boston felt there was no option left but to strike. [6] Russell, A City in Terror, 93 -130; Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

  In response to the announcement of the police strike, Curtis advertised for volunteer policemen; many of these volunteers were young, decidedly Yankee Harvard students. This further exacerbated tensions as a result of the animus between the working-class Irish that made up the majority of the police force, and wealthy, often anti-immigrant Yankees. The strike was also about social class and ethnicity. [7]Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

The “Dangers” of Striking Public Workers

In taking up the strike, the Boston Police Union jumped into the midst of a national crisis. Indeed, in 1919, with the recent Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, many Americans were terrified that organized labor was on the path of bringing the Revolution to the United States–a “Red Scare.” While there were indeed small factions of socialists in America hoping to bring about a worker’s revolution, most labor organizing focused on wages and working conditions. But the idea of unionization for public workers, not to mention affiliation with national labor organizations, aroused deep suspicions for Americans who believed their nation was on the brink of an uprising. The AFL had been helping establish national unions for public and government workers since 1906: these included the National Federation of Post Office Clerks (1906), the American Federation of Teachers (1916), the National Federation of Federal Employees (1917), the National Association of Letter Carriers (1917), and the International Association of Fire Fighters (1918). People across the country, particularly business owners and other elites, were concerned that if public workers were to strike, or worse to join a general strike in sympathy of other workers there would be disastrous consequences. [8] Slater, “The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” 13-38

These discussions turned not unreasonably to the police. If the police were part of an AFL affiliated union what would they do when another affiliated union struck? Would they let it pass? Would they join in? Would they refuse to break the strike if ordered? If the police were in the sway of an outside organization such as the AFL, how was the law to be enforced impartially? Was it the responsibility of the police to remain impartial even to their own plight for the sake of their duty? Commissioner Curtis and newly elected Governor Calvin Coolidge felt that it was untenable for police officers to abandon their public trust in such a manner given the importance of their responsibilities. [9]Slater, “The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” 13-38.

The Strike and Riots

On Tuesday September 9, 1919, as the strike began and the police walked out of their stations, the situation quickly spun out of control. Crowds gathered downtown for the event to mock the police who stayed on their jobs or those who left, or to taunt them by gambling in the streets in their presence. Games of dice sprung up all over, from the Common to Scollay Square, often in sight of police stations. On the first day of the strike, mobs formed around the city and escalated their acts to looting, violence, and destruction of property. Crowds looted up and down Washington Street and throughout the downtown area along Summer and Winter Streets. [10] Russell, A City in Terror, 171-204; Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

The chaos in the “revolutionary corridor” had become a voice for those who felt marginalized to express their grievance and resentment.

Gunshots from overwhelmed non-striking police, amateur armed volunteers, and from rioters rang out intermittently throughout the night. Numbers of wounded sought medical attention, and a handful of people, including a striking police officer, died. There were even confrontations in Pemberton Square, right in front of the Police Headquarters. Similar chaos also erupted around the city from Charlestown to South Boston, particularly in immigrant communities that felt marginalized by the Yankee elite. Despite the robust numbers of volunteer police little could be done to stop the thousands who had formed at gathering places like Scollay Square. By Wednesday, the second day of the strike, Curtis had to admit that the situation was out of control and Mayor Peters took command of the police and called out the State Guard. The units brought over seven thousand troops into Boston. Armed with loaded Springfield rifles and fixed bayonets, these amateur soldiers-turned-police struggled throughout the second day to reassert law and order. All too often, order came at the point of bullets and those bayonets. Firing over crowds sometimes led to firing into crowds. Stab wounds and bloodied faces were not uncommon. As each day passed, all of Boston came under the control of the State Guard and the various volunteer police groups. One regiment of some 800 men barracked in Faneuil Hall, rotating eight hours on duty and 16 hours on call. These men used the “Cradle of Liberty” as their home for several months. Much like the volunteer police, the officers and most of the troops of the guard were Yankees. [11] Russell, A City in Terror, 171-204; Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

  Later in the evening the arrival of an infantry unit in South Boston provoked another incident when the guardsmen opened fire after an object thrown by the rioters injured their officer. Three were killed and nine wounded as a result. By Thursday, after intermittent violence during the night that ended with three more dead, the guard was in control of the city; eventually peace and order were restored to the city under the threat of force. In fear of a potential sympathy strikes, and after doing little over the course of the riots besides making himself hard to find or contact, Governor Coolidge called out the rest of the State Guard to ensure that order was maintained. He also strongly supported Curtis’s decision to fire the striking officers. In a telegram conversation with Samuel Gompers, founder and leader of the AFL, over the actions of Curtis and himself during the strike, Coolidge earned national acclaim that he eventually rode to the White House. In that exchange he captured the public with one particular sentence “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody anywhere, any time.” [12] Russell, A City in Terror, 131 -170, Tager, Boston Riots, 153 – 170.

In the aftermath, the courts treated those who were arrested harshly, and many newspapers compared the incident to the Bolshevik Revolution. The city hired a new police force who received many of the improvements and pay increases that the striking officers had demanded. Eventually, on December 21, the guard completely cleared out of Boston. The public’s sympathies had been turned against the strikers by the very politicians who had ignored their plight. [13] Russell, A City in Terror, 171-204; Tager, Boston Riots, 153 -170.

The fallout from these events was a huge blow to the push to unionize public employees. As a result of the strike and the accompanying riots, the logic that the police and potentially other public employees, were not “employees” or “laborers” but were more akin to soldiers, gained traction. AFL affiliated public worker unions started disappearing. Cities forbade their local police and firemen from membership in an affiliated union and other public employees had things little better. [14]Slater, “The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” 13-38.

The disruption and conflict sparked by the Boston Police Strike and the Governor’s lack of response to it brought protesters and violence to the city’s downtown core, to the very same streets where earlier generations had brought their own forms of activism to effect social and political change. In 1919, turmoil had once again come to the city streets on a scale rarely seen. Unlike many previous examples this chaos was not guided by a particular cause or creed. The actions of the police and of the rioters were judged harshly by the people of their time. However, the root causes that led to the riots are found within the politics and ethnic tensions that created the issues the police were having in the first place. The Police strike and riots of 1919 were not the first time that violence erupted in downtown Boston as a result of the failure of politicians to represent the people they governed and to address the issues facing them. They also would not be the last. Though rioting is generally denounced by many as an acceptable way of expressing of discontent, it still occurs in this revolutionary corridor. When people feel that those in power are not sufficiently addressing an issue or cause, people continue to come to Boston’s revolutionary corridor to make their voices heard.


Footnotes[+]




Questions to Consider:

  1. What are some rights that unions protect?
  2. One of the arguments against forming police unions was that it would make police officers biased in favor of other striking workers. Do you believe it is possible to be truly impartial? If not, how can we overcome our own biases?
  3.  What are some of the reasons that the police went on strike? Can working conditions such as these still be found throughout the world?



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Further Reading

Farmer, Brian. “The Boston Police Strike of 1919: In Response to Low Wages, Poor Working Conditions, and the Inability to Affiliate Themselves with the American Federation of Labor, Boston Policemen Went on strike.(HISTORY - PAST AND PERSPECTIVE).” The New American (Belmont, Mass.) 27, no. 14 (2011): 36-40.

“Roll Call: Researching the Men Behind the 1919 Boston Police Strike,” University Archives and Special Collections, Healey Library, University of Massachusetts Boston, accessed April 20, 2021, http://www.bpstrike1919.org.

Russell, Francis. A City in Terror : 1919, the Boston Police Strike / by Francis Russell. New York: Viking Press, 1975.

Slater, Joseph. “Public Workers: Labor and the Boston Police Strike of 1919.” Labor history 38, no. 1 (1996): 7–27.

Tager, Jack. Boston Riots: Three Centuries of Social Violence. 143–170. Northeastern University Press, 2001.

White, Jonathan R. “Violence During the 1919 Boston Police Strike: An Analysis of the Crime Control Myth.” Criminal justice review (Atlanta, Ga.) 13, no. 2 (1988): 61–68.